The involvement of States in the Ukrainian and Gazan conflicts – even through apparent refrainment – conditions humanitarian aid so much that it denies it any grounds, despite the legal rules that these same States accept. Here, Jean-François Corty analyses this situation, which is not just absurd but, above all, dreadful for populations.
The impact of conflicts on civilians sheds light on some well-documented constants, for which Ukraine and Gaza, subjected to two high-intensity wars, are no exceptions. A few examples of these well-known constants would be the displacement of populations, the destruction of vital infrastructures and homes, tensions in health systems, a more or less successful roll-out of aid, shortages due to blockades and sieges, and the involvement of international judicial authorities. The tangle of ties among the humanitarian responses that result from such conflicts, as well as the unique political contexts concerned, explain the particularity of the operational attitudes that are adopted by the different aid players involved – States, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and supranational organisations – and that are sometimes diametrically opposed to each other, even though the universal nature of international humanitarian law (IHL), which governs these players, is based on respect for common humanity.
Here, we first illustrate these varying approaches through the difficulties that humanitarian workers encounter in trying to find their role in the following two contexts: Ukraine, which benefits from abundant resources, putting on display a glut of international aid; and Gaza, where a siege and mass bombings keep up widespread shortages and insecurity, in the face of which NGOs are virtually helpless. Second, we will look at the persistent use of sieges and military blockades as tools of modern barbarity in these two regions. And lastly, we will underline the limits of State aid and unapologetic politicisation of it, given that the double standards in respect for human life are, in this issue, extremely worrying.
Aid workers trying to find their role
In the wake of the atrocities carried out by Hamas on 7 October 2023, the Gaza Strip endured a siege combined with intense bombings that caused mass destruction of vital infrastructures and homes and triggered the displacement of over 90% of its population. As a result of this, the number of arrivals of lorries carrying supplies into Gaza was drastically limited – in a zone that mostly depended on provisions from outside. Gaza’s civilians, numbering more than two million, were trapped inside this zone. Their access to healthcare was limited by a local health system crushed by equipment shortages, staff exhaustion and the demolition of hospitals and health centres. Moreover, around 300 humanitarian workers have been killed in the bombings in the space of eleven months. Most of these workers were employees of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). For over 70 years, UNRWA has been the backbone of social support and health assistance for Palestinian civilians. The Israeli army considers UNRWA an enemy, so it has made it a political and military target. NGOs are helpless in meeting all needs here, even though, thanks to their local teams, they manage to provide a certain amount of care and meet logistical needs in dangerous conditions. The food security constraints caused by the intense bombings of health structures and the entry obstacles for teams, medical equipment and food – which are nevertheless prepositioned in Egypt and Israel – limit the operational capacity of NGOs and their intervention zones. These constraints are part of a colonial war in which the occupying forces set no boundaries in their disrespect for IHL.
The shortages are organised with support from many countries, including democratic countries, some of which are members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, among others). In contrast to these shortages, we can observe a glut of international aid in Ukraine. This fact alone calls into question the added value of NGOs expected to respond to disruptive situations in countries with an effective health and social infrastructure. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, millions of displaced people were able to be evacuated from the most dangerous zones of Ukraine and hosted in large cities in the rest of the country. At the same time, millions of refugees who benefitted from temporary protection offered by the European Union (EU) found welcoming homes in different European countries, chiefly Poland and Romania.
“We can observe a glut of international aid in Ukraine.”
The security issues involved, namely a constant threat from Russian missiles throughout Ukraine and closeness to the front lines, restrict not so much the operational development of NGOs as their search for suitable operational routes. Indeed, Ukraine is not a country that is poor in resources. Its health system works relatively well, even though it has now been affected by nearly three years of war, damage inflicted on more than 500 health structures and over 130 doctors being killed. The authorities have responded well to emergencies and needs in catastrophe medicine, for example in tending to war casualties, for which international NGOs were dismissed on the grounds of military confidentiality. Moreover, civil society in Ukraine has swung into action to contribute to national solidarity. In these conditions, NGOs intervene in the gaps: the operational openings where aid can be significant – the opposite of contexts where NGOs regularly substitute authorities and where duplicate actions stack up. Most foreign NGOs in Ukraine have focussed on helping evacuate casualties from critical zones, on logistical assistance for withstanding cold conditions, on access to healthcare for displaced people in precarious situations and the elderly inside the country, on violence relating to gender and on mental health issues – some of these missions not being priorities in local health policies. The strengthening of operational partnerships with players in Ukrainian civil society has been one of the main drivers in broadening international aid workers’ prospects for intervention.
Blockades and sieges: a modern form of barbarity
A “blockade” is, in legal terms, a coercive measure whereby one or several States seek to isolate a geographical zone in order to cut off its communications and supplies and its economic ties with the outside world. The aim is to force this zone to submit or capitulate by depriving it of the resources it needs to survive. Contrary to a siege, which is characterised by encirclement, a resulting isolation of the locality and attacks aimed at annihilating any resistance, a blockade often takes place on a wider scale and seeks to stifle the target more broadly or indirectly.
We can distinguish these practices from “embargoes”, which are economic and commercial sanctions designed to target regimes in power. Embargoes especially impact civilian populations, who become victims of economic recessions and of general social impoverishment. Public health issues immediately arise because access to medicines is reduced and infrastructures are weakened with an effect on the quality of health services. Embargoes against Cuba, Haiti, Iraq and Sierra Leone in the 1990s helped verify these collateral effects, which occurred despite appeals from NGOs for certain foodstuffs and vital products to be excluded from the embargoes – pleas that were not always heeded.[1]Richard Garfield, Effets des Sanctions Économiques sur la Santé et le Bien-être des Populations, Réseau aide d’Urgence et Réhabilitation, février 2000, … Continue reading
Indeed, it is always civilian populations who pay the heaviest price in humanitarian crises engineered in such a way. A blockade is an act of war governed by IHL that requires States to allow, despite all else, the free movement of impartial humanitarian aid that is vital for civilians to survive. A siege breaches IHL if it does not spare health structures from serious damage and if there is no agreement for casualties, ill people, children and pregnant women to be evacuated. Furthermore, famine may not be used as a weapon of war. And humanitarian aid should be permitted in order to tackle excessive shortages for civilians.
“A blockade is an act of war governed by IHL that requires States to allow, despite all else, the free movement of impartial humanitarian aid that is vital for civilians to survive.”
Since 2022, several Ukrainian cities, including Kherson and Bakhmut, have undergone sieges carried out by the Russian army. Following eighty days of intense bombings, the city of Mariupol fell into the hands of the invading forces, leaving the survivors in a desperate situation. This city, which is of strategic importance for the Russian president, had already resisted attacks in 2014. The siege destroyed almost all the city and killed thousands of people, although many of Mariupol’s inhabitants foresaw the siege and managed to escape in time. Despite Russian propaganda and efforts to cover up crimes committed, accounts have revealed the extent to which cultural and historical heritage has been destroyed. On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an international arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. This arrest warrant concerns accusations of war crimes, especially the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia during the invasion of Ukraine.[2]International Criminal Court, Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Press Release, 17 March 2023, … Continue reading
In Gaza, after a seventeen-year blockade against the zone, a siege was set up against it following the attacks on 7 October 2023. According to the Israeli authorities, this siege aims to eradicate the Hamas movement. And according to some, it even aims to eradicate all Gazan civilians, who are accused of being “all responsible” for the pervading insecurity.[3]Amnesty International, Des preuves accablantes de crimes de guerre, alors que les attaques israéliennes anéantissent des familles entières à Gaza, communiqué de presse, 20 octobre 2023, … Continue reading By September 2024, after eleven months of bombings, there had been at least 40,000 deaths and around 100,000 casualties, mostly women and children, not to mention thousands of victims still beneath the rubble and deaths caused by a lack of healthcare and food – tragic proof of the siege’s “effectiveness”. Not only does this siege prevent freedom of movement and block access to healthcare, but it also obstructs the evacuation of civilians and drastically limits the arrival of humanitarian aid. Given these shortages and this intentional destruction, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) did not hesitate to mention, as early as in January 2024, a likely risk of genocide and, in April, a heightened risk of genocide.[4]Human Rights Watch, Gaza: World Court Orders Israel to Prevent Genocide, 26 January 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/26/gaza-world-court-orders-israel-prevent-genocide At the same time, the ICC applied for an arrest warrant against two Israeli leaders, including the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and three leaders of Hamas.[5]International Criminal Court, Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine, 20 May 2024, … Continue reading In July 2024, the United Nations evoked an intentional famine of a genocidal nature in light of the number of concrete cases of malnourished children in Gaza.[6]United Nations, UN experts declare famine has spread throughout Gaza strip, Press Release, 9 July 2024, … Continue reading Over in the West Bank, short-term sieges of some towns is a method commonly used by the Israeli army, which does not hesitate to bomb healthcare centres and obstruct movement of ambulances and humanitarian workers during such operations.
Aid politicised, victims depoliticised: common abuse at State-level
States are legitimate players in international aid. This aid can come in the form of direct support for governments of countries concerned, for example by mobilising armies in the face of natural catastrophes. They can also act indirectly by financing certain agencies of the United Nations, as well as independent players like NGOs, whether local or international. All kinds of politicisation of State aid are as old as States themselves. Yet this politicisation responds to strategic interests that are out of tune with the humanitarian principles of NGOs: impartiality, selflessness and, for some, neutrality. In the context of occupations or military operations, the confusion between military affairs and humanitarian aid is a well-documented tendency in many circumstances, whether in the American intervention in Afghanistan following the attacks on 11 September 2001 or, more recently, in France’s intervention in the Sahel region, to give just two examples.[7]Youenn Gourlay, « Au Sahel, l’humanitaire, une autre tactique militaire », Le Monde, 9 septembre 2020.
“All kinds of politicisation of State aid are as old as States themselves. Yet this politicisation responds to strategic interests that are out of tune with the humanitarian principles of NGOs.”
Countries can also control international aid by limiting independent organisations’ access to their territory – or indeed to their enemy’s territory in a conflict. Gaza is an example of this. The situation breaches IHL as the Israeli army has prevented proportionate aid from entering this zone for several months. Moreover, State aid can be subjected to certain political, economic and military conditions with concessions of the same nature being demanded in exchange. France, which cut its financing for Burkina Faso and Niger following diplomatic tensions with these countries, considers aid to be a political weapon – an attitude that could be seen as “humanitarian blackmail”.[8]Nathanaël Charbonnier, « Sahel : des ONG dénoncent la décision de la France de suspendre l’aide publique au développement au Niger et au Burkina Faso », podcast, Franceinfo, 29 septembre … Continue reading Politicisation of aid also finds expression in sanctions and counterterrorist measures at international, national and regional levels. Such policies make humanitarian and medical workers, who have to negotiate with groups deemed terrorists in order to support the local civilians these latter govern, potentially accomplices of those terrorists. Indeed, this perspective puts such aid workers at a higher risk of targeted attacks and of being treated as criminals.[9]Aïda Ndiaye, Léa Gauthier, Camille Gosselin et al., “The risks we face are beyond comprehension”: Advancing the protection of humanitarian and health workers, Médecins du Monde, … Continue reading Lastly, in certain contexts that are less delicate, international aid can only come through governmental agencies or through local organisations or charities, as is the case in Nepal.
Certain world regions put conditions on aid operations, based on strategic interests, more than other regions do. And these strategic interests do not meet the sole basic needs of populations. We saw this in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Western countries redirected funds to Ukraine that were originally earmarked for the crisis in Afghanistan, as well as other crises, where the needs are nonetheless colossal. This tendency illustrates the notion of “forgotten crises”.
As far as Gaza is concerned, Washington and European capitals announced, in March 2024, that a maritime aid corridor would be opened up. This aid corridor would involve boats sailing from Cyprus – in other words, the EU – and docking at a pier designed to complement their meagre, hazardous air drops. Following several weeks spent trying to set up this aid corridor and technical problems due to bad weather, the initiative was abandoned in the end. This humanitarian fiasco amounted to States simply gesticulating. These States preferred to defend an absurd operation – dispatching aid by sea – rather than defend a ceasefire that would have properly paved the way for aid – already amassed in bordering regions – to be sent in by land. The cynical nature of this politicisation of humanitarian aid has been accentuated through several American vetoes against requests for an immediate ceasefire from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) – a ceasefire that would make it possible for aid to enter the Gaza Strip in huge quantities.[10]Nations unies, Gaza : le Conseil de sécurité fait sienne une résolution rédigée par ses 10 membres élus et appelant à un cessez-le-feu immédiat pendant le ramadan, 25 mars 2024, … Continue reading Furthermore, the US voted against a standstill of weapons entering the zone, requested by the UNHRC in April 2024, and it continued to provide the Israeli army with the weapons it needed to pursue the war.[11]Nations unies, Gaza : le Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU réclame un embargo sur les armes à destination d’Israël, 5 avril 2024, https://news.un.org/fr/story/2024/04/1144606 In this way, Europe and the US use aid to depoliticise Gazans as citizens with legal rights: both Europe and the US limit themselves to humanitarian charity instead of actually imposing proper application of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the decisions of the ICJ and respect for requests made by the UNHRC, which evokes Gazans’ right to life. This depoliticisation of victims – a well-known trend in the sociology of humanitarian action – underlines the existence of a State mechanism for reproducing symbolic violence whereby power is disguised in the very gestures through which it is exercised.[12]Benoît Coutu, « De la dépolitisation humanitaire », Aspects sociologiques, vol. 14, n° 1, avril 2007, p. 113-139, … Continue reading
Indeed, even if State aid is legitimate, its humanitarian nature, in regard to NGOs’ principles, always remains limited. In light of this comparative view of the contexts of Ukraine and Palestine, we can only restate the need to guarantee an independent humanitarian space for NGOs if they want to remain relevant players in international relations and in the geopolitics of aid. It is an existential necessity, for associations and the principles they are supposed to uphold, to continue keeping a distance without excluding contextualised partnerships with States, some of which, as we have seen, consider IHL to be an adjustable variable and more of a vehicle for domination than a vehicle for justice.
Translated from the French by Thomas Young
