Local aid workers are frontline players, but also the first ones to be targeted by belligerents. Here, the author pays tribute to their work and underlines their difficulty to abide by the principle of neutrality. He also suggests how this principle could be adjusted based on the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts.
From the outset of the brutal escalation of hostilities in Ukraine and Gaza, humanitarian aid was rolled out. As always, the first aid was local and came from local organisations. In turn, and as media outlets all over the globe focused their attention on these two regions, international aid agencies geared up as well. States have provided huge aid budgets. Yet some of these same States contribute to the war efforts too. So hundreds of aeroplanes and trucks have been loaded with medical aid and food and have headed to these two regions. We can all still remember the images of convoys of trucks heading to Ukraine, amassed at the Polish and Moldavian borders, or of trucks blocked between Arish in Egypt and Rafah in the Gaza Strip.
Yet most international NGOs (non-governmental organisations) have faced the same reality: sending foreign aid workers has turned out to be excessively dangerous and sometimes unnecessary because of an efficient health system (like in Ukraine) or even impossible because of entry restrictions (like in Gaza). This reality, shared with us by NGOs and the media, could give the impression of international humanitarian aid that is hampered, ineffective and not actually reaching populations in danger. Aid has continued to be largely delivered by national humanitarian workers in these two countries, organised by national or local structures already present, trained and driven by an unfailing spirit of solidarity. Given the military aggression that their respective countries have undergone, we can understand why local aid providers have little sense of neutrality, or even none at all. But this lack of neutrality has made them vulnerable to incessant attacks from the Russian or Israeli belligerents. This eruptive situation in the two conflicts underway should prompt us to think of new systems for aid and protection of these national players, especially given that the localisation of aid has, for many years, been on the humanitarian community’s agenda. The absolute principle of neutrality has been tested particularly severely in modern wars. It could be adjusted for the sake of effectiveness of aid delivered by national players. So there are three major questions that we will tackle in this article.
Is international aid hampered, ineffective and too far from populations?
International NGOs (INGOs) had long been aware of the contexts of the two conflicts underway. Yet they were surprised by the violence and scale of the bombings right from the outset of these two wars. They had to get organised in unprecedented circumstances. International humanitarian aid in Ukraine was financed by countries supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia. However, countries that support Israel politically, and sometimes militarily, are funding aid going to Palestinians. The issue might not be the subject of this article, but the delivery of humanitarian aid thanks to funding from countries and institutions directly involved in the conflict is enough to bring up the contentious matter of neutrality. Yet this also raises the issue of effectiveness of aid as the fate of vulnerable populations clearly depends on the political choices that determine funding, though this issue is much older than the two conflicts we are interested in here. For example, in Ukraine, several State funders, including the French government, have forbidden INGOs from helping populations in territories under Russian control. And in Gaza, the US (United States) government quickly offered to finance field hospitals in zones that the Israeli army had unilaterally declared to be “humanitarian zones”, despite a total absence of hospital protection. The suspension – under Israeli pressure – of US funding for UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) dealt a heavy blow because of this agency’s share of aid work in the zone.[1]Abby Stoddard, Paul Harvey, Monica Czwarno et al., Humanitarian Access SCORE Report: Gaza – the first six months. Survey on the coverage, operational reach, and effectiveness of humanitarian aid, … Continue reading Similarly, according to a telephone survey of Gaza inhabitants, the local population reproaches Israel for blocking humanitarian aid but does not vindicate local authorities that misappropriate humanitarian aid for personal or political purposes.[2]Idem. For example, both in Ukraine and Gaza, international humanitarian aid served, from the outset, as a political tool for powerful countries involved in these conflicts either remotely or closely, which cancelled out some of that aid’s effectiveness before it could even be delivered.[3]Tiara Ataii,“Why Ukraine is moving the needle on old debates about humanitarian neutrality”, The New Humanitarian, 16 May 2023, … Continue reading
On the ground, we of course see constraints that are inherent to humanitarian work in any war zone, but these constraints are particularly striking here. For example, in the first days of the Gaza conflict, access to populations in danger became a nightmare for international organisations. On the one hand, it was a nightmare to evacuate humanitarian workers who wanted to get out, and, on the other hand, it was a nightmare to bring into the zone vital products, medicines and workers ready to help. As we have already seen so many times in other contexts (in the Tigray region, in Ethiopia, and Sudan to give recent examples), the complete blockade that Israel has imposed upon the Gaza Strip has made the awful administrative blockages faced by international aid there seem utterly absurd. The first trucks loaded with medicines and aid workers only entered the zone after several weeks of negotiations.
And in Ukraine, despite a well-prepared communication campaign from the Ukrainian authorities calling for international solidarity, this solidarity came up against Russian bombings. In the first months of the war, most INGOs remained blocked in the city of Lviv, in the far west of the country. In spite of a strong desire to deliver aid, the intensity and unpredictability of Russian strikes, as well as the advances of its army on the ground, completely halted international teams far from the front lines. So the main method of assistance involved sending products and materials of all kinds from Europe, via Lviv, to Ukrainian volunteer organisations on the front lines.
In both wars, the unprecedented violence of the bombings has been one of the biggest obstacles. INGOs, which are responsible for their employees’ safety, are obviously reluctant to send their workers into zones where they face a high risk of injury or death. Similarly, aid workers themselves are reluctant to enter such zones. So, when the level of violence does not require evacuation from whole zones, filling posts needed to deliver aid becomes a major issue of aid effectiveness. Gaza is the perfect example of this, with teams having been evacuated several times in accordance with Israel’s warnings and bombings.
Excessive administrative demands, high-intensity violence and an incompatibility with realities on the ground have been, and remain, key factors in the ineffectiveness of international humanitarian aid. Furthermore, this aid has been misused politically by the countries involved in the conflicts, so it has shown its limits in Ukraine and Gaza. The involvement of national players in humanitarian aid is therefore vital in meeting the needs of the population. Yet we cannot ignore the fact that national players are, by definition, from the country in which they work. And these two conflicts are especially illuminating in that regard. Mentioning that national players are, by definition, from the country in which they work is deliberately pleonastic here. Indeed, it is worth stressing that these players are obviously sensitive to the horrors that their own country is undergoing and that they are rooted in networks of friends and communities that may well express themselves through biases that are understandable. These biases can sometimes take the form of patriotic support or even collusion with belligerents.
National humanitarian aid in the context of war: is neutrality being called into question?
We cannot emphasise this point enough: local civil societies are the ones that always provide initial aid when a humanitarian crisis suddenly arises, whatever the cause. Whether they are civil defence units, firemen, first-aid workers or charities, local players in civil society are, by definition, the first ones on the scene and the last ones to leave. Moreover, they are the closest ones to populations in danger. This is true in many countries affected by a natural catastrophe or conflict.
“In Ukraine and Gaza, these national workers have not, contrary to most international workers there, had the possibility of leaving, nor have they been obligatorily evacuated.”
Ukrainian volunteers, the Palestinian Red Crescent, UNRWA employees, private initiatives, civil society organisations and, beyond these players, employees in national public or private services – when they still have the resources to operate – were the first providers of aid in Ukraine and Gaza. Many of these players have become humanitarian workers, if they were not already. We call them “nationals” or “locals”, though with these words we do not always know how to distinguish a desire for clarification from a certain disdain. We find the same configuration in Sudan with communal kitchens and, a few years ago, we saw a similar trend in Syria with the White Helmets.
In Ukraine and Gaza, these national workers have not, contrary to most international workers there, had the possibility of leaving, nor have they been obligatorily evacuated. We can explain this by the origin of their structure, their place of residence and their experience gained over many years: ten years for Ukrainian volunteers and over forty years for Gazan first-aid workers. Given their easy access to populations and thanks to their efficient organisation, these workers are now in the majority in the humanitarian system. In Ukraine, a study carried out at the start of the war listed 150 national NGOs, as well as religious groups and around 1,700 newly formed local aid groups.[4]Humanitarian Outcomes, Enabling the local response: Emerging humanitarian priorities in Ukraine. March-May 2022, June 2022, … Continue reading
Similarly, in Gaza, according to a study in February 2024, the main providers of aid are national workers for UN agencies, for the Red Crescent, for the Palestinian NGO MA’AN, for the Palestine Ministry of Social Development, and for cooperation with Arabian Gulf countries. At the time of that study, fewer than ten international NGOs were managing operations directly on the ground.[5]Abby Stoddard, Paul Harvey, Monica Czwarno et al., Humanitarian Access Score Report…, op. cit.
These local players are often seen as active participants in the war, so they are frequently targeted by the opposing armed forces. Their closeness, their effectiveness and their involvement with only one of the belligerents make them very vulnerable to collateral damage, to attacks from the opposing army and to denigration of their actions. For example, according to data gathered by the Aid Worker Security Database, 163 aid workers were killed in Gaza during the first three months of the war.[6]Meriah-Jo Breckenridge, Mariana Duque-Díez and Abby Stoddard, Figures at a glance, 2024, Humanitarian Outcomes, July 2024, … Continue reading In total, since the start of the war in October 2023 and up to August 2024, as many as 275 national aid workers were killed and seventy-nine injured, whereas only seven international aid workers were killed and only two injured.[7]Aid Worker Security Database. From a purely statistical perspective, 97.5% of aid workers killed were from Gaza. This shows, on the one hand, the huge involvement of national workers and, on the other hand, a complete absence of protection towards them. The Israeli army targets hospitals, aid convoys and medical workers without trying to conceal it.
In Ukraine, from the start of the war in February 2022 up to August 2024, thirteen Ukrainian aid workers were killed, thirty-five injured and thirty-nine kidnapped, whereas eight international workers were killed and thirteen injured.[8]Idem Yet it is difficult to distinguish Ukrainian volunteers from more than 30,000 civilians killed or injured to date.[9]Statista, Nombre de civils tués ou blessés enregistré par le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine le 24 février 2022, en juin 2024, … Continue reading
Should the principle of neutrality be adjusted to balance the protection of local aid workers with the effectiveness of aid?
In theory, neutrality is the cornerstone of humanitarian aid in armed conflicts. There could be no better guarantee of access and protection for operating in between belligerents without being suspected of taking part in the hostilities. Some dispute the very basis of this principle, yet for a long time players have adapted this principle in many contexts. The concept is especially disputed in Ukraine and Gaza, but this is precisely because of the scale and involvement of national players, which can be largely explained by the reasons that we mentioned earlier.
“The Palestinian Red Crescent and Ukrainian volunteers have a point in common: they swing into action in the heart of a war in their own country to save people in danger.”
Indeed, after almost three years of war in Ukraine and over a year of war in Gaza, how can we ask humanitarian agencies and aid workers delivering vital aid to their own population to remain indifferent to the fate of this population? The Palestinian Red Crescent and Ukrainian volunteers have a point in common: they swing into action in the heart of a war in their own country to save people in danger.
Whether essential products are delivered to civilians in distress or, rather, to frontline fighters surely has the same degree of importance in the minds of these local workers.[10]Jessica Alexander, “Is Ukraine the next tipping point for humanitarian aid reform?”, The New Humanitarian, 25 July 2022, … Continue reading So it would be unrealistic to ask them to remain neutral while international workers from aid agencies go to the war zone with an outlook that is necessarily more distant and less involved.
And contrary to foreigners, a country’s national workers do not enjoy the same freedom of action in the face of policies and laws applied in wartime. In Ukraine, the war is experienced as a resistance to a foreign aggressor that is, furthermore, a major power in international geopolitics. The whole country is committed to this resistance and is fighting the Russian army’s invasion with a sense of total war. Ukrainians ask for support and expect to be supported in their struggle against this enemy. They have difficulty tolerating a demand for neutrality from international NGOs. Moreover, Ukrainian legislation defines humanitarian aid as “free, targeted assistance […] for beneficiaries who need aid to […] prepare for armed protection of the State and for protecting the State in the event of armed aggression or armed conflict”.[11]Verkhovna Rada d’Ukraine, Loi sur l’aide humanitaire (Loi n° 1192-14), Vedomosti Verkhovna Rada d’Ukraine (VVR), 1999. This definition alone, which dates back to a period before the war, shows the extent to which the concept differs to that in force in Western democracies.
In a letter signed by over 150 national NGOs in August 2022, addressing international organisations in Ukraine, volunteers told these global players to “let local civil society actors decide [on their] priorities and how [they] wish to act in solidarity in this conflict”.[12]“‘If not now, when ?’ An open letter to international donors and NGOs who want to genuinely help Ukraine”, Philanthropy‧ua, (n‧d.), … Continue reading
In Gaza, where almost four generations have not experienced any other situation than Israeli occupation, the rhetoric of resistance is even stronger among Palestinians who collectively undergo Israeli bombings and assaults. It would be difficult to expect from them the same neutrality as that embodied by a humanitarian worker on site for six weeks on an emergency mission. The Red Crescent, the zone’s leading national aid agency, coordinates much of the assistance for the local population. Of course, it operates under the auspices of the Palestinian Ministry of Health, in the same way that the Red Cross is an “auxiliary to public authorities” in France.
As regards UNRWA, whose actions Israel, the US and many Western counties have vehemently called into question, it is worth remembering that this agency is a branch of the UN (United Nations) that dates back to 1949. An internal inquiry report, written after the attacks, is suggestive: it highlights as breaches of the agency’s neutrality “instances of staff publicly expressing political views, host-country textbooks with problematic content being used in some UNRWA schools, and politicized staff unions making threats against UNRWA management and causing operational disruptions”.[13]Le Monde avec AFP, « Gaza : un rapport indépendant souligne le rôle “indispensable” de l’UNRWA », 22 avril 2024, … Continue reading One of the key measures that the report evokes to remedy these violations is to recruit more international staff members posted on the ground – such staff members currently represent 1% of the personnel[14]UNRIC, Rapport Colonna : renforcer la neutralité de l’Agence d’aide aux Palestiniens, Centre régional d’information pour l’Europe occidentale, 22 avril 2024, … Continue reading. It is also suggested that the agency should completely depoliticise textbooks. Incidentally, this raises the issue of collective memory and the impact of international policies on the development of sovereign societies.
“In Gaza and Ukraine, humanitarian aid could not be as effective as it is without the actions of national aid workers and national medical staff.”
Perhaps then, more generally, the principle of neutrality should be adjusted for better protection of national humanitarian workers who deliver aid in their country. In Gaza and Ukraine, humanitarian aid could not be as effective as it is without the actions of national aid workers and national medical staff. Yet for all the reasons mentioned earlier, these local workers find themselves beneath the bombs of belligerents who do not care about protecting them. International workers are less effective in both contexts, but they are better protected.
In a context where localisation of aid and partnerships dominate discussions at humanitarian conferences, support for local players through protection better than that which these players can provide alone is doubtless an avenue worth exploring. By positioning themselves alongside national workers and by vigorously informing all belligerents about the neutrality of their role, international organisations can, in a way, vouch for their local counterparts. We can hope that the media coverage and diplomatic protection that international players enjoy will dissuade belligerents from attacking any aid worker. In some contexts, the role that international organisations play in regard to national aid agencies should be adjusted for the sake of a common goal: to improve the impact of their actions on the population. There is a balance to be found, between delivering aid directly and letting players already on site deliver it.
This could take the form of political actions to try to influence belligerents and their allies so that they do not target national aid workers when the latter have the means to help the population. It is also about being able to testify, in regard to belligerents and public opinion, to this local aid, yet without deciding on how this aid should be delivered.
As is already the case in certain conflicts, international organisations can serve as go-betweens to inform parties relentlessly, they can pass on aid workers’ GPS coordinates to belligerents, and they can have an influence at all levels to ensure respect for their integrity, yet without inciting or constraining national players financially.[15]In other contexts, national NGOs that rely on international funding can be restricted, out of financial incentive, to respect traditional humanitarian neutrality. Yet in Ukraine and Gaza, this … Continue reading Based on the model that already exists for journalists and defenders of human rights, more resources for the physical protection of local players should be provided, yet without imposing safety rules. Lastly, risk should be shared out better to reduce it, yet without simply passing risk on.
Moreover, it was this form of aid that prompted the first international aid workers to go to Gaza following the 7 October 2023 massacre. First, there was a surgical team from the International Committee of the Red Cross. We saw photos of them on the steps of a hospital threatened with destruction by the Israeli army. Next, there was a UN team, whose many spokesperson interviews we saw. And a few days later, there was a team from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), whose accounts we read almost every day.
This commitment from international aid agencies will never be enough, of course, without legislation curbing belligerents that attack aid workers. It is not the role of humanitarian agencies, whether national or international, to hold armed forces accountable for the protection of aid workers, to judge and to apply sanctions. That role belongs to political players. The Ukraine and Gaza wars are helping adjust the neutrality of aid agencies for the sake of effectiveness. Yet it is absolutely vital to not suggest that the impunity enjoyed by certain belligerents in regard to international humanitarian law is unfettered
Translated from the French by Thomas Young
