The intensity of fighting in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip does little to hide the differences in the way each conflict is being treated in politics, in the media and in humanitarian terms. Here, Rony Brauman looks at the motivations behind these “double standards” which, with disregard for the civilian victims, add the disgrace of Western democracies to the tragedy being played out there.
Of the fifty or so conflicts currently raging around the world (the term “conflict” conventionally meaning an armed confrontation causing over 1,000 deaths in a year), two stand out, at least when viewed from Europe: the war between Russia and Ukraine and that between Israel and Palestine. Both are centre stage, but they are not being given equal billing: the Gazan war’s media repercussions and political impact in Europe clearly has the upper hand.
The fact remains that these two conflicts are dominating minds and the public arena, if only because of the strong European involvement in each one, but also because of the contradictory political treatment of these two conflicts by European institutions and governments – a source of criticism and protest, particularly among students.
I will look back at this tension after pointing out the similarities between the two conflicts. Both conflicts are raging close to the European Union geographically, rather than in remote lands; both conflicts are punctuated with accusations of genocide; both conflicts are being waged by leaders wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), with the exception of President Zelenskyy; both conflicts prominently feature humanitarian aid, albeit in unequal measure; and finally, both conflicts are generating strong political confrontations, of different kinds and on different scales yet unprecedented in their intensity, at least when you consider their role in electoral rhetoric and their public impact.
All this was enough for this issue’s editors to suggest comparing views from humanitarian players and observers on these two conflicts in particular, rather than on Afghanistan and Myanmar or even Sudan and Ethiopia, for example – all very bloody conflicts too.
Confusion between politics and humanitarian aid
Let us begin by considering the vagueness and ambiguity of the intertwined notions of political solidarity and humanitarian assistance we find in both situations. The Toute l’Europe website tells us that “Since war broke out in Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has consistently expressed its support for the country. Financial, humanitarian or military, the various types of aid amount to more than 143 billion euros.”[1]Boran Tobelem, « Guerre en Ukraine : quels sont les montants des aides de l’Union européenne depuis 2022 ? », site Internet Toute l’Europe, 4 juin 2024, … Continue reading Different types of assistance are combined here in a seemingly homogeneous whole, where funding that is neither budgetary nor military in nature is classed as humanitarian (civil protection, displaced people and refugees). Like in other situations, civilian aid provided as political support is described as humanitarian, thereby erasing its main attribute of being non-partisan. As we will see, this is no minor detail.
Recent history is not short of examples of humanitarian aid being tied to a political cause when helping a population that is victim of a regime being fought. For example, when former French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius visited Jordan in August 2012, he said:
“France’s position is clear: we think that Bashar al-Assad is the executioner of his own people, that he must go – the sooner the better – and that we must take political […] and military action, this is what resistance fighters do on the ground, and humanitarian action. These two types of action are not contradictory. All this goes hand in hand and we are helping the Syrian people, especially the opposition, mainly through local networks, whether networks of doctors or others. There are also other actions, which are obviously secret.”[2]Statement by Mr Laurent Fabius, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the situation in Syria, in particular the issue of refugees, at the Zaatari camp (Jordan), 16 August 2021, … Continue reading
If we replace “Bashar al-Assad” with “Benjamin Netanyahu”, and “the Syrian people” with “the Palestinian people”, we can imagine the effects of such a confusion of concepts. It goes without saying that a government makes political choices and alliances by its very nature, but describing the various facets of its aid in appropriate terms should be an affirmation of its choices. This is not intended to be an attack on the humanitarian cover being given to clandestine armed operations, like when the United States, under Ronald Reagan, concealed its support for the armed opposition in Nicaragua,[3]Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, Dictionnaire pratique du droit humanitaire, Éditions La Découverte, 2013, p. 605. but, more prosaically, on the use of language that removes any distinction between various forms of aid and solidarity. Above all, it is about reiterating that a humanitarian team is not supposed to set itself up in a country with a political programme, as the French Foreign Minister’s statement seems to imply. Our contacts in occupied and war-torn territories expect this too – understandably – and this is indeed the case in the two conflicts we are focussing on here.
A selective “right to defend oneself”
Earlier, I mentioned the basis of this issue, namely what the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have in common. It is now time to add a qualification – summed up by the phrase “double standards” – to that underlying theme in a critical, rather than descriptive, manner in order to describe the way Western governments are handling these two conflicts politically. Military occupation and the annexation of territories by force – features common to Russia and Israel in these two situations – elicit reactions from the West that are diametrically opposed to one another. In one of the conflicts, the right to defend oneself belongs, as indeed it should, to the occupation’s victim (Ukraine), with the occupier (Russia) sanctioned. In the other conflict, it is the Israeli occupier that is granted the right to defend itself, with occasional calls for restraint but without reference to its status as an occupier, nor to its obligations to protect and assist, nor to the occupied party’s right to resist.
Let us be clear here: this is not about justifying the atrocities committed against Israeli civilians by Hamas on 7 October 2023. That was a mass crime, an act of terror. However, this unjustifiable attack is not inexplicable. Yet, as the UN Secretary-General said, this attack “did not happen in a vacuum” but after decades of a “suffocating occupation”.[4]Libération et AFP, « Le chef de l’ONU juge que l’attaque du Hamas n’est pas “arrivée dans le vide” provoquant la colère d’Israël », 24 octobre 2023, … Continue reading
“To strongly condemn the 7 October attacks is a matter of common decency, just as it is to recognise the context in which they occurred should also be a matter of common decency.”
To strongly condemn the 7 October attacks is a matter of common decency, just as it is to recognise the context in which they occurred should also be a matter of common decency. Thousands of prisoners held without charge, the legalised practice of torture, evictions, theft of land (2,370 ha since 7 October), constant attacks by settlers in the West Bank, successive wars and the blockade of Gaza, thousands of dead and wounded: this is the “context”. Of course, the Israel-Palestine story did not begin at 6.30am on 7 October 2023. Yet if we believe what we see on 24-hour news channels, to mention this real context – not as a mitigating factor but as a set of enlightening facts – is tantamount to condoning terrorism.
This is nothing like the humanitarian consensus regarding the war in Ukraine. In a study on this subject, the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) notes that “A number of experienced humanitarians reported that they had never worked in a situation where geopolitical interests, donor preferences and funding mechanisms were so explicitly aligned.”[5]Jethro Norman, “Humanitarian principles are under fire in Ukraine”, Danish Institute for International Studies, Policy Brief, 21 February 2024, … Continue reading
After analysing the security situation of relief agencies close to the front line, the author goes on to note a practice that would earn immediate media condemnation for anyone thinking of doing the same thing in Gaza, where any movement is subject to authorisation from the army (and is not safe despite this):
“Anecdotal accounts from USAID-affiliated organizations suggest a heightened risk profile and even direct targeting. […] This has led to an ongoing debate among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) regarding the use of vehicle branding and attire in conflict zones. Many volunteer groups have chosen to paint their vehicles, including ambulances, in military colours in order to blend in near the frontlines. They also wear attire that resembles military clothing, partly to blend in and partly because it looks impressive.”
However questionable these choices made by these local NGOs in Ukraine may seem according to Red Cross principles – also in terms of appropriateness and security, no doubt – they are not in themselves shocking. In specific circumstances, wearing camouflage and travelling in unmarked vehicles to provide aid in a combat zone is justified in the name of effectiveness. After all, was this not what Médecins Sans Frontières, Médecins du Monde and Solidarités were doing in Afghanistan in the 1980s?
The dividing line between political solidarity and humanitarian commitment can be blurred, putting the champions of humanitarian action governed by the principles of impartiality and neutrality in a difficult position. This is especially so given that, in both these wars, the NGOs are working for just one side. This is not meant as a judgement on this way of doing things, but as a reminder that aid given to the Ukrainians has not been the subject of any public dispute: the emergency workers are aligned with Western positions. They are on the “good side” and therefore beyond criticism. The Danish analyst is simply pointing out that the principles of neutrality and impartiality are being strained in this conflict.
A one-sided right to criticise?
Undoubtedly, it is among human rights organisations that the political polarisation is most stark. On 4 August 2022, after several detailed press releases and reports about Russian war crimes, Amnesty International (AI) published a press release entitled “Ukraine: Ukrainian fighting tactics endanger civilians”.[6]Amnesty International, Ukraine: Ukrainian fighting tactics endanger civilians, Press Release, 4 August 2022, … Continue reading It was in fact on the occasion of a report about the actions of the Russian military that AI documented how:
“Ukrainian forces have put civilians in harm’s way by establishing bases and operating weapons systems in populated residential areas, including in schools and hospitals, as they repelled the Russian invasion that began in February. Such tactics violate international humanitarian law and endanger civilians, as they turn civilian objects into military targets. The ensuing Russian strikes in populated areas have killed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure.”[7]Idem.
It must be pointed out that the war crimes committed by Russian forces had been extensively documented and condemned by AI, whose field survey repeatedly encountered the military installations referred to in the press release. Should Amnesty International have kept quiet about these breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL)? Judging by the smear campaign launched against this NGO after this statement was published, this is clearly what many journalists would have expected. The following day, President Zelenskyy himself opened fire, so to speak, accusing AI of an attempt “to grant amnesty to the terrorist state” of Russia, “to put the aggressor and the victim of aggression on an equal footing”,[8]Marianne Lecach avec AFP, « Guerre en Ukraine : pour Zelensky, Amnesty International “tente d’amnistier l’État terroriste” de Russie », Le Journal du Dimanche, 5 août 2022, … Continue reading and “to shift blame from the aggressor to the victim of aggression”.[9]RFI, Ukraine : Volodymyr Zelensky répond aux accusations d’Amnesty International, 5 août 2022, … Continue reading No-one can reproach a head of state for defending his army, but it is only fair to point out the outrageous and baseless nature of this criticism. It should not be forgotten that IHL, by its very nature and by definition, does not differentiate between belligerents, does not judge who is right or wrong, or who is the aggressor and who is the victim of aggression. Its role is limited to regulating the methods of warfare, in order to banish excessive cruelty.[10]For a critical analysis of this ambition, see Rony Brauman, “Oases of Humanity and the Realities of War. Uses and Misuses of International Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Principles”, Journal … Continue reading
The Ukrainian head of state was fulfilling his role here, but the same cannot be said of the journalists and media commentators who took his side by drowning the incriminating facts in a flood of dubious, even insulting, remarks. Consider this tweet from French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy, which many others could have written: “Accusing Ukraine of operating from civilian areas? That’s like rebuking the French Resistance for fighting in the streets of Paris in August 1944. A combination of stupidity and cynicism. Tarring the aggressors and their victims with the same brush. Playing Putin’s game. That’s where we’re at. Appalling.”[11]Bernard-Henri Lévy, 4 August 2022, https://twitter.com/BHL/status/1555210902936473600 This shows that, depending on whether one is in Ukraine or Palestine, the civilian population is not defined in the same way.
Two diametrically opposed wars
The precise human toll of the war in Ukraine is not known as the numbers of military dead and wounded are kept secret on both sides. In August 2024, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report on civilian casualties since February 2022: more than 11,000 dead and 22,000 injured. The number of combatants killed is, according to conservative estimates, between 42,000 and 80,000 on the Ukrainian side and double that for the Russian army.[12]Ned Garvey with Meduza, “Dueling claims on Ukrainian losses. What we know”, 29 February 2024, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/02/29/dueling-claims-on-ukrainian-losses These figures are based on various estimates by military experts rather than on any detailed accounts and should therefore be treated with care, but they do indicate a total (probably a minimum) of 200,000 dead and two to three times that number wounded.
The human toll of the war in Gaza is also approximate: 41,000 dead in September 2024 according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, to which must be added victims buried under the rubble and not counted, as well as the indirect victims who have died or are facing imminent death due to a lack of healthcare. If we correlate these figures to the population of Ukraine, which is twenty times larger, the direct mortality inflicted on Gaza’s population would be close to 1,000,000 deaths.
For Israel, still in September 2024, we can add 350 dead and 2,300 wounded among Israel’s military to the 1,200 victims of the 7 October attacks (400 military personnel and police officers and 800 civilians killed, as well as 5,200 injured).[13]Statista, Israël / Territoires palestiniens : nombre de morts et de blessés en raison de l’attaque du Hamas contre Israël et des contre-attaques d’Israël dans la bande de Gaza et en … Continue reading Applying the same comparative principle to the population of Ukraine, which is four times larger, would give 6,000 dead and 30,000 injured among Israelis. These are the comparative figures, which are contrasting to say the least, for the human losses in these two conflicts, showing both the disproportion between Israeli and Palestinian losses, and an inverted ratio between civilian and combatant deaths: three quarters of deaths soldiers in Ukraine and three quarters of deaths civilians in Gaza – including more than 10,000 women and 20,000 children.
“For NGO aid workers, these two wars are diametrically opposed.”
For NGO aid workers, these two wars are diametrically opposed. Following the systematic destruction of public infrastructure (including hospitals), territorial confinement and the uprooting of almost the entire population, there is a massive need for assistance in Gaza. Yet the need is limited to only certain pockets in Ukraine, where the authorities have significant resources, an infrastructure that is mostly intact, a vast territory that can provide safety for internal refugees, and neighbouring allies hosting nearly 6,000,000 refugees. This does not mean that the war in Ukraine is a clean war – Russia’s many war crimes are appalling – but the Palestinians are facing a genocidal operation in which the very conditions of their existence are being rapidly destroyed. Doctors, emergency workers and journalists have been killed in their hundreds there, like no other war in the last fifty years.
Other conflicts are raging – notably in Sudan, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – but Western States, always quick to remind us of the importance of the law, are not granting any of the belligerents an implicit licence to kill a captive population en masse. In fact, with the exception of Israel, no State practising apartheid and colonisation and engaged in blatant acts of genocide is rewarded with the title of democracy or receives the kind of military, diplomatic or economic support that makes it possible to pursue its policy of crushing others. In no other comparable situation do those who denounce major crimes and call for an end to them find themselves suspected, even accused, of incitement to racial hatred.
“It is not international law or humanitarian principles that are buried in the rubble of the Israeli bombings, but what remained of the legitimacy of Western States to claim to be its defenders.”
In Ukraine, accounts from aid workers are blowing with the prevailing winds. Despite denouncing – quite rightly – Russian abuses, they add little to the information provided by journalists, and subscribe to the Western division of good and evil and of what is just and unjust.
The same cannot be said for Gaza. It is not international law or humanitarian principles that are buried in the rubble of the Israeli bombings, but what remained of the legitimacy of Western States to claim to be its defenders.
Translated from the French by Derek Scoins
