changement climatique

Climate change and humanitarian crises: a nuanced perspective

Rodrigo Mena
Rodrigo MenaDr. Rodrigo Mena is Assistant Professor of Disasters and Humanitarian Studies at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University Rotterdam and Deputy Director of the Hague Humanitarian Studies Centre (HSC). His research focuses on the intersection of disaster governance and risk reduction, climate change and humanitarian action, especially in fragile, conflict-affected and vulnerable (FCV) settings. He also serves as a Board Member of the International Humanitarian Studies Association (IHSA) and the Expertise Centre Humanitarian Communication. In addition to his academic roles, Dr. Mena provides advisory and consultancy services for governmental organisations, various international and national NGOs, and UN agencies. Before holding his current positions, he gained nearly twenty years of professional experience working with NGOs, the UN and ministries, and as a consultant and researcher in disaster-affected and conflict-affected regions.

The relationship between climate change and humanitarian crises is often oversimplified in public dis­course. Contrary to popular belief, climate change is not the direct cause of disasters, but rather an amplifier of pre-existing risks, exacerbating socio-economic and political vulner­abilities. This nuanced vision calls for an integrated approach that goes beyond a simple emergency response to tackle the root causes of vulnera­bility and promote anticipatory and resilience strategies, notably through anticipatory humanitarian action and climate-resilient local adaptation.


Multiple reports highlight the significant role of anthropogenic climate change (CC) in both the occurrence of humanitarian cri­ses and its impact on humanitarian action. Regarding the latter, CC can contribute to the increasing frequency of climate-re­lated disasters, health challenges, food insecurity and migration. Additionally, its compounded effects can exacerbate conflicts and livelihood deterioration, while the rising number of crises intensifies competition for limited humanitarian funding, further straining response efforts.[1]Paul Knox Clarke, Climate Change and Humanitarian Action, Groupe URD, November 2021, https://www.urd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Climate-Change-Humanitarian-Action-2021-2.pdf ; Mackinnon Webster, … Continue reading As a result of the former, humanitarian organisations and donors have begun integrating CC into their risk frameworks and action plans.[2]Norwegian Red Cross, ICRC, Making Adaptation Work: Addressing the compounding impacts of climate change, environmental degradation and conflict in the Near and Middle East, 2023, … Continue reading However, public discourse, along with some academic and grey literature in the humanitarian sector, often oversimplifies the issue, portraying CC as a primary cause of disasters, conflict, displacement and humanitarian crises. This oversimplification is also reflected in United Nations (UN), non-governmental organisations (NGO) and donor strategies, as well as broader political, institutional, economic, and social frameworks. This article challenges that perspective by unpacking a more nuanced understanding of CC vis-à-vis humanitarian crises and actions. While CC may play a role in migration, disasters and conflict, the true drivers behind these crises are mediated by human actions and decisions, governance structures and societal vulnerabilities. CC alone does not directly cause crises. Rather, it magnifies existing weaknesses within human systems, as explained below.

The mediating role of human action in climate-related crises

A cornerstone of disaster theory is the understanding that disasters are not solely the result of hazards (processes or phenomena that can cause harm)[3]United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Definition: Hazard, 2023, https://www.undrr.org/terminology/hazard but that vulnerability sharply determines how such events affect people and the environment. Extreme weather events alone do not inherently lead to disasters, forced migration or social conflict. Rather, societal actions – or inaction – determine whether these events escalate into crises or disasters.[4]Ilan Kelman, Disaster by Choice: How our actions turn natural hazards into catastrophes, Oxford University Press, 2020 ; Greg Bankoff and Dorothea Hilhorst (eds.), Why Vulnerability Still Matters: … Continue reading This understanding underscores the notion that disasters are not natural, but rooted in sociopolitical dynamics.[5]Ksenia Chmutina, Jason Von Meding, J. C. Gaillard et al., “Why natural disasters aren’t all that natural”, open Democracy, 14 September 2017, … Continue reading

For example, some countries have robust infrastructure capable of absorbing rainwater, well-equipped disaster response systems, or advanced early-warning mechanisms to predict storms, while others lack these capacities. As a result, the same rainfall can have vastly different impacts, largely due to disparity in governance, infrastructure and socio-economic inequality. Similarly, while many disasters and humanitarian crises are linked to weather-related events such as hurricanes, droughts and floods – and some of these can, in turn, be attributed to CC – the key factor determining their impact is how societies anticipate, respond to and mitigate these risks.[6]Ben Wisner, J. C. Gaillard and Ilan Kelman (eds.), Handbook of Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction, Routledge, 2012.

This also applies to climate-related displacement and conflict. Whether people decide to leave a place, to stay or may lack the option to move (e.g. trapped populations) is often driven by socio-economic factors rather than a singular climate stressor.[7]Arup Kumar Poddar, “Climate Change and Migration: Developing policies to address the growing challenge of climate-induced displacement”, The International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and … Continue reading Likewise, conflicts attributed to CC typically stem from deeper issues such as poor resource management, political instability and historical grievances.[8]Laura E. R. Peters and Ilan Kelman, “Critiquing and joining intersections of disaster, conflict, and peace research”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, vol. 11, 10 July 2020, pp. … Continue reading Research further shows that while disasters and conflicts frequently co-occur (with up to 70% of conflict-affected areas also experiencing disasters), their relationship is indirect, mediated by multiple societal factors.[9]Nicolás Caso, Dorothea Hilhorst and Rodrigo Mena, “The contribution of armed conflict to vulnerability to disaster: Empirical evidence from 1989 to 2018”, International Journal of Disaster Risk … Continue reading

The previous arguments establish that CC’s role in humanitarian crises is indirect and mediated by human (in)action. While a full explanation of how this happens is complex and beyond the scope of this article, below are four key ways in which this occurs:

First, a well-established argument in literature is that CC acts as a risk-amplifier rather than the root cause of crises. It exacerbates vulnerabilities and magnifies existing social, economic and political challenges, acting as a trigger or accelerator rather than a sole cause.[10]Greg Bankoff and Dorothea Hilhorst (eds.), Why Vulnerability Still Matters…, op. cit.

Second, CC contributes to livelihood deterioration, particularly in sectors like agriculture. For example, prolonged droughts or unpredictable weather can devastate agriculture, leaving farmers unable to sustain their families. Without effective mitigation, many may be forced to migrate as a coping mechanism. Such displacement can strain resources, heighten social tensions, and, in extreme cases, contribute to conflict and humanitarian crises.[11]Norwegian Red Cross, ICRC, Making Adaptation Work…, op. cit. ; Arup Kumar Poddar, “Climate Change and Migration…”, art. cit.

Third, CC may increase (or reduce) the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.[12] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for policy makers(Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability), 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2 ; Ilan Kelman, “Climate … Continue reading Without adequate prevention and response measures, such events can lead to mass casualties, infrastructure damage and societal disruption. An important caveat here is attribution: many extreme weather events cannot be conclusively linked to CC, though some have varying levels of confidence.[13]Nathaniel L. Bindoff and Peter A. Stott, “Detection and attribution of climate change: from global to regional”, Climate Change 2013 – The Physical Science Basis, IPCC, Cambridge University … Continue reading This uncertainty should not be problematic though, as action is needed to protect at-risk populations, regardless of attribution.

Fourth, CC is not just a climatological phenomenon. It also shapes political, economic and societal dynamics. It has given rise to a vast industry focused on climate mitigation and adaptation, including carbon trading, climate-neutral products and political movements like Extinction Rebellion. This reinforces the idea that CC is deeply embedded in societal narratives and structures, influencing decision-making at multiple levels.

“Even when the full spectrum of risks is difficult to anticipate, societies must focus on mitigating foreseeable threats.”

Therefore, while CC cannot be considered the sole driver of humanitarian crises, its role in making certain events less predictable or more severe cannot be ignored. Even when the full spectrum of risks is difficult to anticipate, societies must focus on mitigating foreseeable threats and addressing the factors that mediate CC’s impact on crises.

Moreover, as explained above, many of these risks are ones our societies are creating and, therefore, have the responsibility to prepare for and mitigate.[14]Greg Bankoff and Dorothea Hilhorst (eds.), Why Vulnerability Still Matters…, op. cit. ; James Lewis and Ilan Kelman, “The good, the bad and the ugly: Disaster risk reduction (DRR) versus disaster … Continue reading Humanitarian actors, in turn, are developing evolving mechanisms to anticipate or address crises related to (not induced by[15]Andrew Baldwin, “Pluralising climate change and migration: An argument in favour of open futures”, Geography Compass, vol. 8, no. 8, 5 August 2014, pp. 516–528.) CC.

Evolving humanitarian responses

Measures to address CC are usually divided in two categories: tackling global warming by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and capturing excess CO₂ (mitigation), and adapting to its widespread effects on ecosystems and communities (adaptation).[16]Norwegian Red Cross, Overlapping Vulnerabilities, op. cit. ; Ilan Kelman, Disaster by Choice…, op. cit ; Paul Knox Clarke, Climate Change and Humanitarian Action…, op. cit. This distinction is critical because any conversation about humanitarian actors’ role vis-à-vis CC must clearly differentiate between working on mitigation or adapting to the impacts related to it. In the first category, some humanitarian organisations have taken steps to reduce emissions or include measures for capturing CO₂ emissions in their programmes, for example, implementing reforestation initiatives.

“Humanitarian actors do not yet fully engage with disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies.”

It is also important to note that CC adaptation typically falls within the scope of development aid and actions rather than humanitarianism. Likewise, humanitarian actors do not yet fully engage with disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies, such as those outlined in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.[17]The Sendai Framework is a global agreement established in 2015 aimed at reducing disaster risk and enhancing resilience by improving preparedness, mitigation and recovery efforts from 2015 to 2030. … Continue reading Moreover, when it comes to addressing the impacts of CC such as the ones outlined above, humanitarian action has historically focused more on responding to crises rather than preventing them. However, this is gradually changing.

Given the growing complexity of climate-related crises, humanitarian organisations are increasingly adopting more proactive and preventive strategies.[18]German Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and International Committee of the Red Cross, Protecting People from the Humanitarian Impacts of Extreme Climate … Continue reading Two key approaches in this shift are humanitarian anticipatory action, which involves taking early action based on forecasts to reduce the impacts of crises, and climate-resilient and community-based climate adaptation (CR-CBCA), which work to build resilience and adaptive capacity mostly at the community level.

Anticipatory Humanitarian Action leverages predictive modelling and climate data to anticipate risks and take action before disasters strike.[19]OCHA, “Anticipatory Action”, 20 mai 2024, https://www.unocha.org/anticipatory-action This approach, often operationalised through the Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA) strategy, has transformed how humanitarian organisations operate by shifting from post-crisis responses to risk anticipation.[20]FICR, World Disasters Report 2009: Focus on early warning, early action, 1 June 2009, https://www.ndma.gov.pk/public/storage/publications/July2024/P5DDMSSLRJ7MCCksYDMg.pdf It emphasises the importance of acting on climate forecasts by mobilising resources, preparing communities and ensuring institutions are ready to respond. By intervening earlier, humanitarian organisations can reduce the scale of disasters, minimise loss of life and lower the economic costs of recovery.[21]Marie Wagner and Catalina Jaime, An Agenda for Expanding Forecast-Based Action to Situations of Conflict, Global Public Policy Institute, Climate Centre, September 2020, … Continue reading

CR-CBCA strategies aim to build resilience by integrating climate adaptation into long-term development planning.[22]Voir International Institute for Environment and Development, Connecting Humanitarians and Climate Change, 2021, https://www.iied.org/connecting-humanitarians-climate-change ; FICR, Programme mondial … Continue reading These strategies focus on strengthening governance, infrastructure and community ownership of adaptation efforts, ensuring sustainable and locally relevant solutions to mitigate future climate risks.[23]CARE International, Community Based Adaptation: An empowering approach for climate resilient development and risk reduction, 2015, … Continue reading While humanitarian actors have only cautiously begun to integrate this approach, particularly given the protracted nature of crises and the critical role of development actions, it offers a promising pathway. CR-CBCA moves beyond short-term crisis management, instead prioritising sustainable development solutions. Examples include improving infrastructure, strengthening governance systems and investing in green technologies, all of which collectively reduce vulnerability to climate impacts over time.

Moving towards integrated climate change and humanitarian frameworks

A critical analysis of the above reveals that both humanitarian crises and CC stem from deeper, systemic issues rooted in global development challenges, highlighting the need for integrated approaches. Many humanitarian crises – whether climate-related or not – stem from issues such as poverty, inequality, weak governance and underdevelopment.[24]Raymond Apthorpe, “From economic development to humanitarian studies”, Development Issues, vol. 3, no. 1, April 2001 ; Dorothea Hilhorst (ed.), Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday … Continue reading CC acts as a stressor on these fragile systems, amplifying vulnerabilities. By framing CC and humanitarian crises as interconnected aspects of the same problem, it becomes possible to advocate a more holistic approach to crisis management: one that addresses both climate adaptation and the underlying development issues.

Some may argue that humanitarian action and CC operate on different scales and timeframes: CC is seen as persistent and cross-societal, while humanitarian crises are seen as exceptional and momentary. However, this perspective reflects an outdated understanding of humanitarianism. The paradigm of humanitarian resilience challenges the notion that crises are exceptional and isolated.[25]Dorothea Hilhorst, “Classical humanitarianism and resilience humanitarianism: Making sense of two brands of humanitarian action”, Journal of International Humanitarian Action, vol. 3, no. 1, … Continue reading Instead, it views crises as part of the fabric of societies, manifesting at varying levels across time and space, similar to the dynamics of CC. Both CC and humanitarian crises are deeply intertwined with systemic vulnerabilities such as poverty, inequality and governance failures.

CC and humanitarian crises also persistently affect societies, though their manifestations may vary in intensity and scope. For example, chronic droughts driven by CC exacerbate food insecurity, creating long-term humanitarian needs. Similarly, protracted conflicts can destabilise regions for decades, amplifying vulnerabilities to climate impacts. Recognising these parallels allows for a more integrated understanding: CC and humanitarian crises are not distinct, but interconnected phenomena that require shared approaches rooted in resilience, sustainability and equity.

The notion that CC is described as a risk-amplifier can also be seeing critically from this integrative perspective. As such, this framing risks oversimplifying the structural and political economy dimensions of both CC and humanitarian crises. CC is not merely an external stressor but is deeply intertwined with historical patterns of extraction, resource allocation and geopolitical power imbalances. For example, the disproportionate impact of CC on Majority world countries[26]“Majority world” and “Minority world” are terms increasingly used in place of terms such as “developing/developed” countries, the “West/Rest” division, or the geopolitical “Global … Continue reading is not accidental but a consequence of centuries of colonial exploitation and contemporary global economic systems that perpetuate vulnerability.

“A more integrated approach would critically engage with questions of climate (and humanitarian) justice, loss and damage, and historical responsibility.”

Therefore, a more integrated approach would critically engage with questions of climate (and humanitarian) justice, loss and damage, and historical responsibility, recognizing that many climate-vulnerable countries are also those least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions yet face the greatest humanitarian burden.

This perspective can also be extended to the two main approaches discussed earlier. For example, while EWEA is vital for timely intervention, it cannot replace broader DRR efforts.[27]Rodrigo Mena, “Humanitarianism and the Sendai framework: A 10-year review of converging and diverging paths”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 3 January 2025. The focus on early action must be integrated, supporting or collaborating more with long-term strategies that address structural vulnerabilities, such as inadequate infrastructure, poor governance or socio-economic inequalities. Without such integration, EWEA risks being reduced to a short-term fix rather than a sustainable solution. A successful example of integration can be seen in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which encourages linking early action to broader resilience-building efforts.

Similarly, while CR-CBCA is essential for building long-term resilience, it must also address the political and socio-economic factors that contribute to vulnerability. For instance, even the most robust climate adaptation strategies will fail if they do not integrate or consider systemic challenges like political instability, land tenure insecurity or entrenched inequality, all of which can undermine community resilience and sustainability.

Another risk of not properly integrating CC and humanitarian crises is that it promotes the view of them as separate phenomena that need to be artificially linked (and, by extension, linked to other phenomena), creating unnecessary complexity. This often leads to parallel systems of funding and action. A useful example is the Triple Nexus approach. Since the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, the nexus approach has advocated better integration of humanitarian, development and peace efforts, arguing that without peace and long-term development, humanitarian actions risk being repeatedly required while failing to address the root causes of societal problems.[28]Summer Brown, Rodrigo Mena and Sylvia Brown, “The peace dilemma in the triple nexus: challenges and opportunities for the humanitarian-development-peace approach”, Development in Practice, vol. … Continue reading To this, some people now propose adding CC as a fourth nexus component.[29]Eric Abitbol and Erin McCandless, “Transforming our common crisis: complexity, climate change, and the humanitarian-development-peace nexus”, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, vol. 17, … Continue reading However, CC action could be seen as already embedded within DRR, which intersects with humanitarian, development and peace efforts. Creating a separate “fourth nexus component” adds complexity without added value.[30]Rodrigo Mena, Summer Brown, Laura E. R. Peters et al., “Connecting disasters and climate change to the humanitarian-development-peace nexus”, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, vol. 17, … Continue reading Instead, the focus should be on leveraging existing frameworks, like DRR, to ensure climate actions are integrated across humanitarian-development fields (which also needs better integration efforts).

CC being framed as a separate phenomenon (and posing different risks) creates the danger of alienating existing strategies, theories and actions that already address its related effects, such as DRR. By integrating CC into existing frameworks, rather than creating new parallel systems, we can strengthen the coherence and efficiency of efforts across humanitarian, development and peace fields. Incorporating climate adaptation into DRR and the Triple Nexus ensures that responses to crises are both immediate and forward-looking, addressing the structural and systemic drivers of vulnerability while avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts.

Finally, humanitarian organisations struggle to integrate CC adaptation because, as a by-product of this non-integrative approach, the funding landscape remains highly siloed. Climate finance mechanisms (e.g. the Green Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund) largely operate within development frameworks, often overlooking the acute and recurrent nature of climate-related humanitarian crises. There is an urgent need to rethink how climate finance can support humanitarian responses beyond short-term emergency relief, facilitating anticipatory action, adaptation and resilience-building in crisis-prone regions. This requires structural reforms in global financial governance, ensuring that CC finance is not exclusively tied to state actors but also accessible to frontline humanitarian responders and local communities.

In conclusion, this article offers a nuanced understanding of the relationship between CC and humanitarian crises, challenging the notion that these are separate phenomena. It moves beyond the narrative that CC directly causes crises, instead emphasising the complex interplay of human, socio-economic and political factors that shape its impacts on vulnerable populations.

While humanitarian organisations must adapt to the escalating challenges posed by CC, they also have a critical role in addressing the root causes of vulnerability, including poverty, inequality, weak governance and underdevelopment. This requires engagement with broader frameworks, such as the Sendai Framework for Action, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) or approaches like the triple humanitarian-development-peace nexus to explore how these can support integrated approaches to climate action. It also invites reflection on whether entirely new systems are needed or if existing structures, such as DRR frameworks, can be more effectively leveraged to embed climate adaptation within humanitarian and development efforts.

Ultimately, breaking down the silos that separate CC, humanitarian action and sustainable development is essential to responding to these intertwined challenges in ways that build long-term resilience and equity across societies.

 

Picture Credit : ICRC

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References

References
1 Paul Knox Clarke, Climate Change and Humanitarian Action, Groupe URD, November 2021, https://www.urd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Climate-Change-Humanitarian-Action-2021-2.pdf ; Mackinnon Webster, Justin Ginnetti, Peter Walker et al., The Humanitarian Costs of Climate Change, Feinstein International Center, December 2008, https://www.preventionweb.net/files/8058_FeinsteinTuftsclimatechange.pdf ; Dr Andrea Steinke, Climate Change and Humanitarian Change: Challenging norms, mandates and practices, Centre for Humanitarian Action, November 2023, https://www.chaberlin.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2023/11/climate-change-en-web.pdf ; Norwegian Red Cross, Overlapping Vulnerabilities: The impacts of climate change on humanitarian needs, May 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/overlapping-vulnerabilities-impacts-climate-change-humanitarian-needs ; Louisa Baxter, Catherine R. McGowan, Sandra Smiley et al., “The relationship between climate change, health and the humanitarian response”, The Lancet, vol. 400, no. 10363, 5 November 2022, pp. 1561–1563, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(22)01991-2/abstract
2 Norwegian Red Cross, ICRC, Making Adaptation Work: Addressing the compounding impacts of climate change, environmental degradation and conflict in the Near and Middle East, 2023, https://shop.icrc.org/making-adaptation-work-pdf-en.html
3 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Definition: Hazard, 2023, https://www.undrr.org/terminology/hazard
4 Ilan Kelman, Disaster by Choice: How our actions turn natural hazards into catastrophes, Oxford University Press, 2020 ; Greg Bankoff and Dorothea Hilhorst (eds.), Why Vulnerability Still Matters: The Politics of Disaster Risk Creation, Routledge, 2022.
5 Ksenia Chmutina, Jason Von Meding, J. C. Gaillard et al., “Why natural disasters aren’t all that natural”, open Democracy, 14 September 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/why-natural-disasters-arent-all-that-natural ; Ilan Kelman, Disaster by Choice…, op. cit.
6 Ben Wisner, J. C. Gaillard and Ilan Kelman (eds.), Handbook of Hazards and Disaster Risk Reduction, Routledge, 2012.
7 Arup Kumar Poddar, “Climate Change and Migration: Developing policies to address the growing challenge of climate-induced displacement”, The International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and Responses, vol. 16, no. 1, 13 March 2024, pp. 149–170.
8 Laura E. R. Peters and Ilan Kelman, “Critiquing and joining intersections of disaster, conflict, and peace research”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, vol. 11, 10 July 2020, pp. 555–567 ; Rune T. Slettebak, “Don’t blame the weather! Climate-related natural disasters and civil conflict”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 49, no. 1, January 2012, pp. 163–176.
9 Nicolás Caso, Dorothea Hilhorst and Rodrigo Mena, “The contribution of armed conflict to vulnerability to disaster: Empirical evidence from 1989 to 2018”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, vol. 95, September 2023 ; Nicolás Caso, Dorothea Hilhorst, Rodrigo Mena et al., “Does disaster contribute to armed conflict? A quantitative analysis of disaster – conflict co-occurrence between 1990 and 2017”, International Journal of Development Issues, vol. 23, no. 1, 21 July 2023
10 Greg Bankoff and Dorothea Hilhorst (eds.), Why Vulnerability Still Matters…, op. cit.
11 Norwegian Red Cross, ICRC, Making Adaptation Work…, op. cit. ; Arup Kumar Poddar, “Climate Change and Migration…”, art. cit.
12  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for policy makers(Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability), 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2 ; Ilan Kelman, “Climate change, weather, and disasters”, LinkedIn, Pulse, 24 September 2021, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/climate-change-weather-disasters-ilan-kelman
13 Nathaniel L. Bindoff and Peter A. Stott, “Detection and attribution of climate change: from global to regional”, Climate Change 2013 – The Physical Science Basis, IPCC, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 867–952.
14 Greg Bankoff and Dorothea Hilhorst (eds.), Why Vulnerability Still Matters…, op. cit. ; James Lewis and Ilan Kelman, “The good, the bad and the ugly: Disaster risk reduction (DRR) versus disaster risk creation (DRC)”, in PLOS Currents, vol. 4, 21 June 2012, https://currents.plos.org/disasters/article/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-disaster-risk-reduction-drr-versus-disaster-risk-creation-drc ; Sukanya Podder, “Mapping child soldiers’ reintegration outcomes in Liberia: A participatory approach”, in Alpaslan Özerdem and Richard Bowd (eds.), Participatory Research Methodologies: Development and Post-Disaster/Conflict Reconstruction, Ashgate, 2010, pp. 165–180.
15 Andrew Baldwin, “Pluralising climate change and migration: An argument in favour of open futures”, Geography Compass, vol. 8, no. 8, 5 August 2014, pp. 516–528.
16 Norwegian Red Cross, Overlapping Vulnerabilities, op. cit. ; Ilan Kelman, Disaster by Choice…, op. cit ; Paul Knox Clarke, Climate Change and Humanitarian Action…, op. cit.
17 The Sendai Framework is a global agreement established in 2015 aimed at reducing disaster risk and enhancing resilience by improving preparedness, mitigation and recovery efforts from 2015 to 2030. See: https://www.undrr.org/implementing-sendai-framework/what-sendai-framework
18 German Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and International Committee of the Red Cross, Protecting People from the Humanitarian Impacts of Extreme Climate and Weather Events: Working Together to Strengthen Anticipatory Action, April 2024, https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2024/04/34IC-Draft-0-Anticipatory-action-EN.pdf.
19 OCHA, “Anticipatory Action”, 20 mai 2024, https://www.unocha.org/anticipatory-action
20 FICR, World Disasters Report 2009: Focus on early warning, early action, 1 June 2009, https://www.ndma.gov.pk/public/storage/publications/July2024/P5DDMSSLRJ7MCCksYDMg.pdf
21 Marie Wagner and Catalina Jaime, An Agenda for Expanding Forecast-Based Action to Situations of Conflict, Global Public Policy Institute, Climate Centre, September 2020, https://gppi.net/media/Wagner_Jaime_2020_FbA-in-Conflict-Situations.pdf
22 Voir International Institute for Environment and Development, Connecting Humanitarians and Climate Change, 2021, https://www.iied.org/connecting-humanitarians-climate-change ; FICR, Programme mondial de résilience climatique, 31 mars 2022, https://www.ifrc.org/fr/notre-travail/catastrophes-climat-et-crises/r%C3%A9duction-risques-catastrophes-climatiquement-6 ; Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés, Fond de résilience climatique du HCR, Global Focus, 2024, https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2024-11/%5BFrench%5D%20Fact%20Sheet%20CRF%20%20%281%29.pdf
23 CARE International, Community Based Adaptation: An empowering approach for climate resilient development and risk reduction, 2015, https://careclimatechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CBA_Brief_ALP_English.pdf
24 Raymond Apthorpe, “From economic development to humanitarian studies”, Development Issues, vol. 3, no. 1, April 2001 ; Dorothea Hilhorst (ed.), Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday politics of crisis response, Routledge, 2013.
25 Dorothea Hilhorst, “Classical humanitarianism and resilience humanitarianism: Making sense of two brands of humanitarian action”, Journal of International Humanitarian Action, vol. 3, no. 1, December 2018.
26 “Majority world” and “Minority world” are terms increasingly used in place of terms such as “developing/developed” countries, the “West/Rest” division, or the geopolitical “Global South/North” approach. While these terms mostly refer to countries, they also recognise that inside each country, it is possible to find people who represent the minority of the world, commonly characterized with high levels of income and formal education.
27 Rodrigo Mena, “Humanitarianism and the Sendai framework: A 10-year review of converging and diverging paths”, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 3 January 2025.
28 Summer Brown, Rodrigo Mena and Sylvia Brown, “The peace dilemma in the triple nexus: challenges and opportunities for the humanitarian-development-peace approach”, Development in Practice, vol. 34, no. 5, 19 April 2024, pp. 568–584.
29 Eric Abitbol and Erin McCandless, “Transforming our common crisis: complexity, climate change, and the humanitarian-development-peace nexus”, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, vol. 17, no. 3, November 2022, pp. 251–256.
30 Rodrigo Mena, Summer Brown, Laura E. R. Peters et al., “Connecting disasters and climate change to the humanitarian-development-peace nexus”, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, vol. 17, no. 3, November 2022, pp. 324–340.

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