In Ukraine, the direct dangers of the conflict are compounded by major environmental damage that is compromising agriculture and ecosystems. According to the authors, despite the scale of international mobilisation, the humanitarian response is still struggling to integrate this ecological dimension, neglecting the specific needs of local communities such as small farmers.
Three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have caused widespread and severe harm to human and non-human life. In addition to thousands of people affected and infrastructure destroyed since February 2022, the war is accompanied by a significant negative impact of hostilities on ecosystems, which also requires a humanitarian response. The war has caused water and air pollution, soil degradation, and biodiversity loss.[1]Andrii Bahinskyi and Nina Potarska, Ukraine: War, Climate Change, and the Limitations of the Humanitarian System, Workshop Report,Alameda Institute, November 2024, … Continue reading Roughly 25% of Ukrainian territory is mined, which makes it impossible for people to live and conduct economic activities in these territories. This has created a double vulnerability of the Ukrainian population affected by the conflict: in addition to the daily risks caused by hostilities on the ground, they face damaged ecosystems, which complicates traditional farming and requires significant resources for restoration. Such a double vulnerability significantly increases humanitarian needs in Ukraine.
Armed conflict also drives climate change, as militaries are contributing massive, but essentially uncounted, carbon emissions
Moreover, the environmental destruction of the war in Ukraine has global – indeed, planetary – implications. The impacts of the war in Ukraine compounded the COVID-19 pandemic, placing stress on food and fuel supply and contributing to a 17% rise in the Food and Agriculture Organization Food Price Index in the first four months of 2022. Armed conflict also drives climate change, as militaries are contributing massive, but essentially uncounted, carbon emissions. Estimates suggest that during the first two years of full-scale war, emissions amounted to 175 million tons of carbon, which is comparable to the annual emissions of the Netherlands. Total costs associated with this damage are estimated at approximately 32 billion dollars.[2]Center for Environmental Initiatives Ecoaction, At COP29, Ukraine Presented a Methodology for Calculating Climate Damage from War, 21 November 2024, … Continue reading
However, despite the connections between human and non-human impacts of the war, the significant international humanitarian response has struggled to engage with the implications of the latter for the former. Notwithstanding the scale of the mobilisation, the international humanitarian response in Ukraine has been criticised for coming with standardised answers and systems rather than focusing on specific needs and local channels. An important problem is the disconnection of expertise from the Ukrainian context, the irrelevant use of experience and cases of other countries that were at war, and the mechanical projection of this experience onto Ukraine.[3]“Solidarity in actions”, open letter from Ukrainian organisations, 11 November 2024, https://www.philanthropy.com.ua/en/news/the-open-letter-solidarity-in-action Among the gaps between the planning and implementation of aid and the needs of people on the ground, environmental and climate issues have been key, contributing to the neglect of certain communities and areas of work.
The climate-humanitarian crisis in the Russia-Ukraine war and the response to it is a topic that has not been sufficiently covered in research so far, and interest in it is only beginning to emerge. This article is part of a research project entitled “Limits of humanitarianism”, which examines the case of Ukraine in the context of the intersection of environmental damage and war, taking into account the fact that war not only creates damage to ecosystems but also causes vulnerabilities along with climate change in people’s everyday lives.[4]See Eleanor Davey and Fernando Espada The limits of humanitarianism: Politics, crisis, and reform in the era of climate change, Alameda Institute, November 2024, … Continue reading The project methodology is based on talking directly with people living in close proximity to hostilities and suffering from war on a daily basis, also drawing on wider research on the current situation with the humanitarian response in the Russia-Ukraine war. This article draws on three sets of consultations and interviews conducted since March 2024. At the first stage of the research, we spoke with experts on climate change and ecology specialising in Ukraine. It was also important during the interview process to hear the opinions of representatives of civil society organisations in order to see the gaps between needs and the humanitarian assistance provided. The further focus of the research was on local farmers in Ukraine, who are important actors in communities as their activities directly relate to interaction with the environment and the people who work on the land damaged by hostilities.
Responding to climate-humanitarian crises
The issue of the relationship between humanitarian responses and climate change has become the subject of significantly increased attention. The twenty-ninth Conference of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (better known as COP29), held in Azerbaijan in November 2024, featured an entire day of parallel sessions on humanitarian issues. As summarised by The New Humanitarian, it illustrated how “Humanitarians are trying to carve out a role for their expertise within the larger climate movement”.[5]Will Worley, “At a pivotal COP in Baku, humanitarians try to define their climate role”, The New Humanitarian, 19 November 2024, … Continue reading The relationship between conflict and climate change is increasingly emphasised as a humanitarian challenge.[6]United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, No Escape – On the Frontlines of Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Displacement, November 2024, … Continue reading However, much of this discourse takes place at the level of calls for change, which itself remains limited.
The Russia-Ukraine war exemplifies these challenges. Environmental law expert Mark Nevitt described the war as “truly an ‘environmental war’, with far-reaching implications for long-term environmental, energy and climate security progress”.[7]Mark Nevitt. “Environmental war, climate security, and the Russia-Ukraine crisis”, Ohio State Law Journal, vol. 84, no. 6, 2024, p. 1361. This is not only the case within Ukraine and the region but also on a systemic level internationally. For example, volatile grain prices have jeopardised humanitarian programmes, including the World Food Programme, which, as of 2021, received 40% of its grain from Ukraine. By the start of 2023, it was estimated that an additional 47 million people were “acutely hungry because of the ripple effects of the war”.[8]Oli Brown et al., The Impact of Russia’s War Against Ukraine on Climate Security and Climate Action.Independent Experts’ Analysis, Chatham House, January 2023, p. 11, … Continue reading The carbon emissions mentioned above will have further cascading impacts over time.
Yet despite recognition of the environmental and climate damage caused by the war and of their impacts on human welfare, both immediate and long-term, funding for humanitarian aid projects within Ukraine has “only partially addressed the ecological and environmental dimensions of war”.[9]Clément Iraola and Beatrice Mosello, Ukraine: Reframing the Narrative of Climate, Environmental Degradation and Conflict, Adelphi/International Rescue Committee, 2024, p. 15. The Humanitarian Response Plan does not explicitly incorporate climate change as a factor that increases risks. Only one of the many infrastructure projects supported by the World Bank in Ukraine explicitly addresses climate resilience. Additionally, the Ukraine Community Recovery Fund, a pooled fund administered by the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, supports local community-based agricultural production on the ground, but these projects do not address climate change impacts and measures to address them.[10]Clément Iraola and Beatrice Mosello, Ukraine…, op. cit. In interviews for this project, residents of local communities emphasised the insufficient involvement of international humanitarian organisations in overcoming the consequences of ecosystem destruction on the ground.
Environmental problems at the local level are of little interest to international funders
Similarly, according to participants in our research, grant providers from international organisations do not see a consistent interest in financing environmental research and projects. A local eco-activist from Kryvyi Rih noted that environmental problems at the local level are of little interest to international funders, arguing that “in general, grantmakers do not really understand the needs of such applied research”. They described modifying a pre-existing project (originally planned in 2019-2020) to reflect wartime conditions: “When Mykolaiv was left without water, [or as] we saw in Mariupol, how people there drank water from the heating system, which is categorically unacceptable under normal conditions. Therefore, we refocused our research on investigating any sources, alternative sources of water supply”. Such local projects still receive little attention from international funders.
These limitations affect many aspects of the aid response to the war, but have particular impacts among certain communities whose experiences sit at the heart of the intersections between conflict and environment, short-term relief and long-term consequences. This is the case for small farmers in Ukraine.
Local farmers in conditions of climate-humanitarian vulnerabilities
Before the war, agriculture was one of the most developed sectors of the economy in Ukraine. Prior to the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, agriculture employed over 22% of the working population, accounting for 22% of all employed people – 3 million people officially and another 1.5 million people unofficially. Agriculture in eastern regions of Ukraine, which was actively developing before the war, is now experiencing an unprecedented crisis.
The importance of small farms in Ukraine is great, but so is their vulnerability in this context. Researchers note that “climate change affects small farmers disproportionately more, because small farmers do not have access to human, social and financial capital and information comparable to large agricultural enterprises”.[11]Oleg Nivievskyi, Pavlo Iavorskyi and Oleksandr Donchenko, “Assessing the role of small farmers and households in agriculture and the rural economy and measures to support their sustainable … Continue reading A farmer from Kupyansk (a frontline zone) described the impact of the combat operations on ecosystems in their area: “Forests burned, plantations burned, everything was broken. There is no reservoir … in Krasnyi Lyman in 2022, a dam was damaged, it collapsed. That is, well, the groundwater has dropped. If there were plans to engage in irrigation there, well, if only all this remained now”.[12]Interview with the authors.
As this example suggests, one major impact of the war has been on water supplies, which significantly complicates irrigation systems for cultivating the land and prevents the local population from accessing drinking water. This vulnerability is accompanied with temperature records that result from climate change. Additionally, already a year from the start of the war, the National Mine Action Authority of Ukraine reported that a full quarter of the country’s territory had been exposed to war, resulting in damage as well as unexploded ordnance. More surveying will continue to be necessary to understand the extent of contamination in agricultural areas.[13]Andrii Bahinskyi and Nina Potarska, Ukraine…, op. cit., p. 13. Currently, smallholder farmers lack the resources for recovery, and humanitarian demining alone requires significant investment (more than $1,000 per hectare).
Providing an adequate humanitarian response in the context of the dual vulnerability of smallholder farmers will be key to the recovery of this sector of the economy and – after the end of hostilities – an important condition for people to return home. The recovery of agriculture has another humanitarian dimension: as noted above, Ukraine is a leading supplier of food to other countries, and the threat of reduced harvests and production as a result of military operations and climate change is already leading to malnutrition in different parts of the world and volatility in food prices.
Notwithstanding the double vulnerability they face and the strategic importance of the sector, our research suggests that small farmers have struggled to gain access to appropriate aid. The farmer from Kupyansk spoke about the limited presence of international organisations near the combat zone: “They came, honestly, we didn’t even contact them. They, the organisations, came to the community, collected data on how much land mines needed to be cleared on farms, we submitted all this data, but everyone refused, said it was too close […] closer than twenty kilometres, there is no conversation. Programmes exist, but no one in this zone wants to work at the moment. People simply refuse, no one wants to do it.”
Access to water has dropped drastically in the region due to the destruction of the dam. The destroyed reservoir needs to be demined and filled, but this, according to farmers, will take more than one year. The land will need to be recultivated, since sand and clay ended up on top of the arable layer of land suitable for farming. In addition, the lack of affordable credit creates difficulties in sowing and harvesting, which is the main source of income for local communities.
While these issues reflect micro-level challenges and needs, they also reflect systemic problems with the humanitarian response in Ukraine. In this way, shortcomings in the climate-humanitarian response should be of concern to all.
Systemic problems with the climate-humanitarian response in Ukraine
There were, in theory, some strengths that the aid response after the Russian invasion could have drawn upon. The presence of conflict in Ukraine since 2014 had contributed to the emergence of structures of mutual aid, civil society programmes and official Ukrainian government aid. Some international humanitarian organisations were also present. The Russian invasion triggered a high level of attention and unusually generous responses among Western societies, both from governments and individuals.
However, the picture of implementation has always been more mixed. According to research undertaken in the first year of the war, recipients received assistance fairly evenly from different providers: international humanitarian organisations (35% of respondents), local volunteers (33%) and local authorities (31%).[14]Ground Truth Solutions, Perceptions of Aid in Ukraine – Quantitative Findings Round 1, December 2022, p. 5. It should be noted that these averages do not account for differences in geography and military context. Among those surveyed who had applied for aid, 11% said they had received nothing.
Interviews undertaken for this research suggest important gaps between local and international responses. According to non-governmental organisation (NGO) activists in Ukraine, international humanitarian organisations and their intermediaries that allocate money came to Ukraine with a ready-made humanitarian response that is replicated from country to country. The study “Perceptions of aid in Ukraine” indicated that recipients of humanitarian aid, even when they were generally satisfied with it, wanted aid to be more specific: medicines and house-building materials that they cannot purchase in any other way.[15]See Call for communication, collaboration, and cash: Perceptions of aid in Ukraine, a study funded by the Disasters Emergency Committee and conducted by Ground Truth Solutions, in partnership with … Continue reading
Ukrainian informants were also concerned about monitoring and reporting of needs. According to local experts we interviewed, a large number of reports by international organisations concern quantitative indicators of the aid provided in Ukraine, but very little attention is paid to assessing the actual satisfaction of the needs of groups marginalised by the war. For example, it is claimed that 2.1 million people are covered by international assistance for child protection.[16]United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ukraine: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2025, January 2025, … Continue reading This number does not take into account how many people have directly had their needs met as a result of assistance and will not experience such needs in the future. Specific groups of more marginalised people, such as children with disabilities or orphans, are not shown in such general data. Gaps in awareness of specific vulnerable groups mirror and compound those related to the double vulnerability created by the interactions of conflict and climate.
Inequalities in the information landscape also shape access to, and distribution of, funding and therefore the aid that is provided. Often, for international organisations, larger-scale projects that can be covered in the central press and that are handled by Kyiv-based NGOs (which have better contacts at the government and ministerial levels) are more important. Such NGOs registered in the capital of Ukraine receive funding more often than local organisations, even if the topics of the projects relate to local issues. When it comes to changing climate and environmental conditions in a specific area, the lack of funding for on-site expertise creates a shortage of research and hence of recognition and understanding of local concerns.
Another trend influencing the role of international aid in the Russia-Ukraine war is militarisation, when the priority was the financing of military operations, rather than civilian affairs. A former representative of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe based in Ukraine described the situation this way: “what we encountered during our human rights monitoring projects was that there was no real, so to speak, capacity to help or political willingness to actually help. Everyone was focused on military actions, to either minimise losses or win the war.” With the militarisation of the problem, there can be no talk of any allocation or reallocation of resources with international assistance until the war is over, because while the war is going on, priority will be given to military assistance as a way to confront a stronger adversary. Militarisation leads to the fact that long-term projects related to climate-change challenges do not receive adequate support from international efforts.
In multiple ways, therefore, our research highlights that humanitarian aid in Ukraine is focused on immediate assistance to the population, while long-term provision of needs, including crucially ecological questions, require greater consideration.
Conclusions and prospects
In the context of global political and economic uncertainty, the prioritisation of individual humanitarian projects will remain unpredictable, especially if hostilities continue. After the end of the war, in the context of post-conflict reconstruction, Ukraine will face a new stage of interaction with international partners, which will have a further impact on the provision of aid on the ground. The full-scale war in Ukraine has put the climate-humanitarian response on the agenda. However, the local needs of the population suffering from the war have not yet been sufficiently assessed and taken into account by international humanitarian organisations.
The full-scale war in Ukraine has put the climate-humanitarian response on the agenda.
The war creates a double vulnerability for the local population, caused by both the destruction of economic infrastructure and the destruction of ecosystems. The situation can be balanced by the involvement of local environmental experts and activists, and greater attention to environmental problems in the projects of international funders providing assistance to Ukraine. With the environment and climate change becoming weighty factors in post-war reconstruction, the return home of Ukrainians and their opportunities to rebuild will depend on taking them into account during post-war reconstruction.
Picture Credit : © Serhi Mykhalchuk
